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325 
AVOIDING DELIBERATION: WHY THE “SAFE SPACE” 
CAMPUS CANNOT COMPORT WITH DELIBERATIVE 
DEMOCRACY  
I. INTRODUCTION 
In everyday life the exchange of opinion with others checks 
our partiality and widens our perspective; we are made to see 
things from the standpoint of others and the limits of our 
vision are brought home to us . . . The benefits from 
discussion lie in the fact that even representative legislators 
are limited in knowledge and ability to reason. No one of 
them knows everything the others know, or can make all the 
same inferences that they can draw in concert. Discussion is a 
way of combining information and enlarging the range of 
arguments. 
—John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 
In November of 2015 Jonathan Butler, a student at the 
University of Missouri, started a hunger strike in response to 
the university president’s lack of concern for various racist 
incidents on campus.1 Eventually, the Mizzou football team 
joined Butler in his strike when the team refused to practice or 
play another game until the president of the university 
resigned.2 The protest sparked a much larger protest on 
campus and resulted in thousands of protestors on the 
university quad.3 The protests were sparked by the occurrence 
of racist vandalism and epithets used to disparage black 
student groups and individual black students.4 The university 
 
 1 Jason M. Vaughn, Mizzou Protestors: Stay Out of Our ‘Safe Space’ or We’ll 
Call the Cops, DAILY BEAST (Nov. 9, 2015, 2:20 PM), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/11/09/mizzou-protesters-to-media-stay-out-
of-our-safe-space-or-we-ll-call-the-cops.html. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Alix Wiggins, Students Plead Guilty to Littering in Cotton Ball Incident at 
Black Culture Center, THE MISSOURIAN (May 5, 2010), 
http://www.columbiamissourian.com/news/students-plead-guilty-to-littering-in-cotton-
ball-incident-at/article_b248de86-b237-561a-8ed0-7dfcf9b9d972.html; Michael E. 
Miller, Black Grad Student on Hunger Strike in Mo. After Swastika Drawn with 
Human Feces, WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 6, 2015), 
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was plagued by incidents in which students dumped cotton 
balls on the steps of a black culture center, a drunk student 
yelled racial slurs during a black student group’s homecoming 
parade practice, and a swastika made of feces was found on 
campus.5 When the president of the university resigned, an 
impromptu protest coalesced on the university quad.6 
The large protest on the quad received widespread media 
attention from national news sources.7 However, the protest 
created a hotbed for disagreement and resentment between 
students and media sources when protestors attempted to 
banish the media from covering the event.8 The protest area 
was deemed a “safe space” for black students to go to escape 
racism on campus and the “insensitivity they encounter in the 
news media.”9 To keep the media from covering the event, 
protestors linked arms and began to push media out of the safe 
space.10 One photographer was forcibly removed by protestors. 
This incident caused reporters to complain that anyone not 
sympathetic to the movement was not welcome in the area.11 
Hostilities toward opposing minority viewpoints on college 
campuses are nothing new to this country and have been 
fostered by the complicity of college administrations.12 
Increased focus on civil rights and minority student retention 
“has understandably given rise to new attempts by some 
institutions to regulate the use of hostile, intimidating, and 
harassing speech on campus.”13 However, the number of 
universities that focus on regulating speech has given rise to a 
 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/11/06/black-grad-student-
on-hunger-strike-in-mo-after-swastika-drawn-with-human-feces/; Thomas Dowling, 
One Month Later, What’s Next for the University of Missouri Protestors?, USA TODAY 
(Nov. 27, 2015, 10:24 AM), http://college.usatoday.com/2015/11/27/whats-next-
university-of-missouri/. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Vaughn, supra note 1. 
 7 See supra notes 1–4. 
 8 Vaughn, supra note 1. 
 9 Terrell Jermaine Starr, There’s a Good Reason Protesters at the University of 
Missouri Didn’t Want the Media Around, WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 11, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/11/11/theres-a-good-reason-
protesters-at-the-university-of-missouri-didnt-want-the-media-around/. 
 10 Vaughn, supra note 1. 
 11 Starr, supra note 9. 
 12 Richard Kirk Page & Kay Hartwell Hunnicutt, Freedom for the Thought That 
We Hate: A Policy Analysis of Student Speech Regulation at America’s Twenty Largest 
Public Universities, 21 J.C. & U.L. 1, 2 (1994). 
 13 Id. 
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tension between minority students’ rights to equal education 
environments and the rights of other citizens to exercise their 
right to free speech in disagreement with various social 
movements.14 In an attempt to combat what many universities 
have deemed to be hateful speech, universities across the 
country have enacted speech codes for their students.15 College 
speech codes were enacted to prevent “racist, sexist, and, in 
some instances, any speech that may create a ‘hostile learning 
environment.’”16 Furthermore, the combination of speech codes 
with the social movement of political correctness may have a 
damaging chilling effect on free expression on college 
campuses.17 Proponents of political correctness on college 
campuses believe that because “the mere discussion of certain 
ideas or viewpoints offend certain groups, the expression of 
these ideas or viewpoints should not be allowed.”18 As a result, 
free expression on college campuses is under attack.19 
The combination of campus speech codes and political 
correctness has produced college environments that are 
intolerant of opposing viewpoints.20 The recent protests 
advocating for safe spaces, like those on the campus of the 
University of Missouri, have put viewpoint intolerance in the 
media spotlight.21 Part II of this Note examines the state of free 
expression on college campuses.22 Part III discusses the role of 
free expression and deliberation in a democracy.23 Part IV 
argues that the establishment of safe spaces is an attempt to 
 
 14 Id. at 3. 
 15 Melanie A. Moore, Free Speech on College Campuses: Protecting the First 
Amendment in the Marketplace of Ideas, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 511, 513 (1994). 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. at 517–18. 
 18 Craig B. Anderson, Comment, Political Correctness on College Campuses: 
Freedom of Speech v. Doing the Politically Correct Thing, 46 S.M.U. L. REV. 171, 174 
(1993). 
 19 See infra Part II. 
 20 See infra Part IV. 
 21 See Judith Shulevitz, In College and Hiding From Scary Ideas, NEW YORK 
TIMES (Mar. 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/22/opinion/sunday/judith-
shulevitz-hiding-from-scary-ideas.html?_r=0; Conor Friedersdorf, Campus Activists 
Weaponize ‘Safe Space’, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 10, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/11/how-campus-activists-are-
weaponizing-the-safe-space/415080/; Charles M. Blow, Race, College and Safe Space, 
NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/16/opinion/race-
college-and-safe-space.html. 
 22 See infra Part II. 
 23 See infra Part III. 
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avoid deliberation on topics and ideas that college students do 
not like.24 Lastly, Part IV also argues that safe spaces that chill 
the speech of those with opposing viewpoints cannot satisfy the 
requirements of a deliberative democracy and therefore hurt 
the democratic process.25 In order to solve the problem of public 
college campuses chilling speech of unpopular opinions, those 
colleges should embrace the theory of deliberative democracy in 
crafting their policies for dealing with unpopular protests or 
speakers.  
II. THE RISE OF THE SAFE SPACE CAMPUS AND THE 
STATE OF FREE EXPRESSION ON CAMPUS 
The safe space campus is a theoretical campus in which 
students are zealously opposed to ideas that are not widely 
accepted in their college social circles. Recently on college 
campuses, college administrations have focused on regulating 
speech that most of society has deemed “hostile, intimidating, 
or harassing.”26 Many schools, rightfully so, have sought to 
eliminate hate speech from their campuses.27 However, 
overzealous regulation of speech has led to a tension between 
“the rights of minorities to fair and equal educations, 
environment, and opportunity” and “the rights of citizens of the 
United States to exercise freedom of speech, even when that 
speech is demeaning to others.”28 Furthermore, the 
combination of administration-imposed speech codes and the 
rise of the political correctness philosophy has resulted in a 
learning environment in which the discussion of ideas that are 
critical to the majority view are frowned upon.29 
A. The State of the Law on Public College Campuses 
The current state of public forum law is that the 
government must allow the citizens of the United States, the 
rightful owners of the streets and other public lands, use of 
that land for free expression.30 The government may regulate 
 
 24 See infra Part IV. 
 25 See infra Part IV. 
 26 Page & Hunnicutt, supra note 12, at 2. 
 27 Id. at 6. 
 28 Id. at 3. 
 29 Anderson, supra note 18, at 176–77. 
 30 Page & Hunnicutt, supra note 12, at 10 (“Current public forum theory now 
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behavior that would be disruptive to the intended use of the 
property; for example, a public baseball park may not be used 
for a protest, but the sidewalks and parking lot of the park may 
be used.31 However, the government may never regulate speech 
based on the content of the speech.32 Any content-based 
regulations imposed by the government are presumed to be 
invalid.33 So long as the regulation is not content based, the 
government may regulate public forum speech on public college 
campuses “with respect to the time, the place, and the manner 
in which student groups conduct their speech-related 
activities.”34 
The Supreme Court defined what kind of content-neutral 
government regulation of speech in a public forum was 
reasonable in United States v. O’Brien:35  
(a) they are within the constitutional power of the 
government; (b) they further an important or substantial 
governmental interest; (c) the governmental interest is 
unrelated to the suppression of the free expression; and (d) 
the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment 
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of 
that interest.36 
Then, in 1981, the Court decided Heffron v. International 
Society for Krishna Consciousness in which it supplemented the 
O’Brien test with two additional requirements that any 
regulations of speech must: (e) be justified without reference to 
the content of the regulated speech; and (f) leave open ample 
 
concludes that governments must allow access to streets, parks, and other public 
property for use by its owners, the citizen of the United States.”). 
 31 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 799–800 
(1985) (“Even protected speech is not equally permissible in all places and at all times. 
Nothing in the Constitution requires the Government freely to grant access to all who 
wish to exercise their right to free speech on every type of Government property 
without regard to the nature of the property or to the disruption that might be caused 
by the speaker’s activities.”). 
 32 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“The First Amendment 
generally prevents government from proscribing speech or even expressive conduct 
because of disapproval of the ideas expressed. Content-based regulations are 
presumptively invalid.”) (citations omitted). 
 33 Id. 
 34 Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 192–93 (1972) (“Just as in the community at 
large, reasonable regulations with respect to the time, the place, and the manner in 
which student groups conduct their speech-related activities must be respected.”). 
 35 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
 36 Page & Hunnicutt, supra note 12, at 11; see O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. 
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alternative channels for communication of the information.37 
Thus, the government must overcome the six hurdles set forth 
in O’Brien and Heffron in order to regulate speech in a public 
forum, such as a public college campus.38 
In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, 
the Supreme Court identified the types of areas in a public 
university where speech may occur and where the government 
may attempt to regulate speech.39 Traditional public fora on 
college campuses have been identified as “streets, sidewalks, 
open mall areas, and other generally public areas on campus.”40 
In Cornelius, the Court concluded that “[b]ecause the principal 
purpose of traditional public fora is the free exchange of ideas, 
speakers can be excluded from a public forum only when the 
exclusion is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and 
the exclusion is narrowly drawn to achieve that interest.”41 The 
Court further stated that where a public university has 
designated an area as a public forum for speakers and protests, 
a speaker or protestor cannot be excluded from that area 
without a compelling governmental interest.42 However, the 
Court has distinguished traditional public fora and designated 
public fora from non-traditional public fora on a college 
campus.43 A speaker or protestor on a college campus may be 
excluded from a non-traditional public forum “as long as the 
restrictions are ‘reasonable and [are] not an effort to suppress 
the expression merely because public officials oppose the 
speaker’s view.’”44 In Cornelius, the Court defined a non-
traditional public forum as “a place or channel of 
communication for use by the public at large for assembly and 
speech, for use by certain speakers, or for the discussion of 
 
 37 Page & Hunnicutt, supra note 12, at 11; see also Heffron v. International Soc’y 
for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647–48 (1981) (“We have often approved 
restrictions of that kind provided that they are justified without reference to the 
content of the regulated speech, that they serve a significant governmental interest, 
and that in doing so they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of 
the information.”). 
 38 See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377; Heffron, 452 U.S. at 647–48. 
 39 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985). 
 40 Page & Hunnicutt, supra note 12, at 11. 
 41 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800. 
 42 Id. (“Similarly, when the Government has intentionally designated a place or 
means of communication as a public forum speakers cannot be excluded without a 
compelling governmental interest.”). 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. (citation omitted). 
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certain subjects.”45 Cornelius solidified the Court’s support for 
the idea that university campuses are the physical embodiment 
of the “marketplace of ideas.”46 
B. The Rise of Speech Codes on Campus 
College speech codes were enacted across the country in an 
attempt to root out racist, sexist, and homophobic speech that 
was perceived by many to be on the rise on college campuses.47 
Speech code proponents argue that instituting a speech code is 
necessary to protect students from prejudice on campus.48 
Proponents have pointed to the rise of “Reaganism” and 
conservative values as the reason for the rise in “increased 
racial tensions and hate speech at college campuses.”49 
Opponents of speech codes argue that universities have 
overreacted to the presence of hate speech on campuses by 
enacting speech codes “without verifying the accuracy of the 
complaints filed against students and without determining 
whether such incidents actually occur on their campus more 
than other schools.”50  
Speech codes have supplemented Supreme Court precedent 
barring the use of hate speech toward another individual in 
public.51 In Chaplinsky, the Court recognized that “[t]here are 
certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the 
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought 
to raise any Constitutional problem.”52 The Court recognized 
that “fighting words” are words “which by their very utterance 
 
 45 Id. at 802. 
 46 Page & Hunnicutt, supra note 12, at 12 (“In addition to being viewed by the 
courts as a public forum, the streets, sidewalks, and open malls of a university are also 
seen as having special characteristics and missions inherent to an institution of higher 
education. These special characteristics become readily apparent when looking at the 
university, as judges have done, as a ‘marketplace of ideas.’”); see also Sweezy v. New 
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (“Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of 
suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to 
study and to evaluate, . . . otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.”). 
 47 Moore, supra note 15, at 514 (“The primary argument for the enactment of 
college speech codes is that universities are witnessing a terrible rise in incidents of 
racist, sexist, and homophobic speech.”). 
 48 Id. at 514–15. 
 49 Id. at 515. 
 50 Id. at 517. 
 51 See generally Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
 52 Id. at 571–72. 
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inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace.”53 
As a result, the Chaplinsky Court designated “fighting words” 
as speech that was outside the scope of First Amendment 
protection.54 The Court created a test to determine what 
“fighting words” are when it said that the “test is what men of 
common intelligence would understand would be words likely 
to cause an average addressee to fight.”55 Then, in Beauharnais 
v. Illinois, the Court expanded the fighting words doctrine to 
include libelous statements made to groups in addition to 
individuals.56 College speech codes have been enacted in order 
to punish “racist, sexist, and, in some instances, any speech 
that may create a ‘hostile learning environment,’” which are all 
common themes that parallel the early foundational cases 
dealing with fighting words and hate speech.  
Despite the close parallels between the Supreme Court’s 
early foundational cases on unprotected speech and the college 
speech codes enacted in the 1980’s, speech codes found little 
acceptance among the judiciary.57 For example, in Doe v. 
University of Michigan,58 the District Court struck down a 
speech code that prohibited “[a]ny behavior . . . that 
stigmatizes or victimizes any individual on the basis of race, 
ethnicity, religion, [or] sex. . . .”59 The District Court concluded 
that the language describing behavior that “stigmatizes or 
victimizes” was so vague that a student could not conform his 
conduct to the rule and definitively know whether he was 
violating the speech code.60 The Court invalidated the speech 
code on due process grounds.61 Similarly, a Wisconsin District 
Court struck down a similar speech code for being overbroad 
and for failing to meet Chaplinsky’s fighting words test and 
balancing test.62 Therefore, some courts have been unwilling to 
 
 53 Id. at 572. 
 54 Id. at 574. 
 55 Id. at 573. 
 56 343 U.S. 250, 258 (1952) (“But if an utterance directed at an individual may 
be the object of criminal sanctions, we cannot deny to a State power to punish the same 
utterance directed at a defined group, unless we can say that this a willful and 
purposeless restriction unrelated to the peace and well-being of the State.”). 
 57 Page & Hunnicutt, supra note 12, at 17–23. 
 58 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989). 
 59 Id. at 856. 
 60 Id. at 867. 
 61 Id. 
 62 UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1181 (E.D. Wis. 
1991). 
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uphold speech codes that are not narrowly tailored to 
unprotected speech.63 
Speech codes have generally failed to pass constitutional 
muster as a result of the codes being overbroad.64 Courts have 
held speech codes to be overbroad when they are “designed to 
burden or punish activities which are not constitutionally 
protected, but . . . includes within its scope activities which are 
protected by the first amendment.”65 Codes that attempt to 
punish unprotected speech, but, when applied, include 
protected speech, have violated the First Amendment and are 
defined as being overbroad.66 In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the 
Supreme Court defined the overbreadth doctrine in the context 
of the First Amendment.67 In Broadrick, the Court noted that 
“the First Amendment needs breathing space and the statutes 
attempting to restrict or burden the exercise of First 
Amendment rights must be narrowly drawn and represent a 
considered legislative judgment that a particular mode of 
expression has to give way to other compelling needs of 
society.”68 Therefore, a statute infringing the First Amendment 
must be narrowly tailored and must be tied to a government 
interest far more important than the individual’s interest in 
free expression.69 
C. The Philosophy of Political Correctness on Campus 
The philosophy of political correctness (“PC”) has likewise 
become popular on college campuses.70 The combination of 
speech codes and self-imposed political correctness by the 
student body may lead to “many students . . . being punished 
as much for what they think as for what they say.”71 Political 
correctness and speech codes operate very similarly since the 
“political correctness philosophy posits that because the mere 
 
 63 Moore, supra note 15, at 525. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. (quoting JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.8 (3d ed. 
1986)). 
 66 Id. (“In other words, a court will consider a speech code overbroad if it 
purports to punish only unprotected speech, such as fighting words, but also punishes 
speech protected by the First Amendment.”). 
 67 413 U.S. 601, 611–12 (1973). 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id.; see also supra notes 57–63 and accompanying text. 
 70 Moore, supra note 15, at 517. 
 71 Id. 
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discussion of certain ideas or viewpoints offend certain groups, 
the expression of these ideas or viewpoints should not be 
allowed.”72 Merriam-Webster defines “Politically Correct” as 
“conforming to a belief that language and practices which could 
offend political sensibilities (as in matters of sex or race) should 
be eliminated.”73 Thus, the political correctness movement and 
the enactment of speech codes on college campuses both have 
similar goals: to remove racist and sexist speech from public 
use.74 
 PC culture, like college speech codes, has undertaken a 
noble cause and has succeeded.75 PC culture on college 
campuses gained a foothold as a result of a rise in hate crimes 
and sexual harassment.76 During the mid-nineties, a million 
students reported being harassed on campus.77 Like speech 
codes, PC culture assumes that certain words and actions are 
inherently biased and society would be better off not using 
those words. As a result, PC culture has declared various words 
in the English language as being harmful and, thus, using 
those words to make an argument would be akin to taking an 
immoral position.  
D. The Heckler’s Veto Cases 
In First Amendment jurisprudence, one of the least 
developed and overlooked lines of cases are the heckler’s veto 
cases, which grew out of the “clear and present danger” cases.78 
These cases deal with the problem that may arise when an 
unpopular public speaker’s speech causes a crowd to grow 
violent which may result in the government silencing the 
speaker instead of the violent crowd.79 The heckler’s veto cases 
are interesting because they hint that while the government 
 
 72 Anderson, supra note 18, at 174 (citing John Leo, PC Follies: The Year in 
Review, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Jan. 27, 1992)). 
 73 Politically Correct, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/political%20correctness (Mar. 26, 2016). 
 74 See supra Subpart II.B. (discussing the enactment of speech codes in order to 
shield college students from speech deemed to be sexist or racist). 
 75 Id. at 696 (noting the rise of hate crimes and sexual harassment on college 
campuses). 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Cheryl A. Leanza, Heckler’s Veto Case Law as a Resource for Democratic 
Discourse, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1305, 1308 (2006). 
 79 Id. 
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may not be able to burden the free speech rights of individuals 
or groups based on content, the government may have an 
affirmative role in ensuring that unpopular viewpoints are not 
censored by people or groups with opposing viewpoints.80 
Heckler’s veto cases arose in the context of a public speaker 
speaking to a crowd that grew violent in reaction to the 
speech.81 As a result of the public speaker’s unpopular views, 
the local police force will step in and ask the speaker to stop 
speaking in order to avoid the crowd growing violent.82 Thus, 
the government would be infringing the speaker’s First 
Amendment right to speak in public as a result of opponents in 
the crowd growing violent, thus, resulting in a heckler’s veto of 
the speech.83 The practical implications of the heckler’s veto are 
that any group of people opposed to the viewpoints of the 
speaker may cause enough of a ruckus to convince the police 
that public safety (or safety of the speaker) is at risk and cause 
the police to shut the speech down. 
In 1949, in a precursor case to the heckler’s veto line of 
cases, the Court in Terminiello v. City of Chicago reversed the 
conviction of Arthur Terminiello after he was arrested and 
convicted of “breach of the peace” as a result of his address to 
the Christian Veterans of America in a Chicago auditorium.84 
Due to Terminiello’s speech, a large protest coalesced outside of 
the auditorium.85 The protestors grew violent and the police 
responded to “several disturbances” due to an “angry and 
turbulent crowd.”86 The Court reversed Terminiello’s conviction 
on the grounds that he was convicted because “his speech 
stirred people to anger, invited public dispute, or brought about 
a condition of unrest,” which are reasons that go against the 
purpose of the First Amendment.87 The Court recognized that 
“free debate and free exchange of ideas” are essential to an 
 
 80 Id. (“The relevance of heckler’s veto case law lies in its strong commitment to 
fulfilling the First Amendment’s ultimate goal of allowing viewpoints to be expressed, 
even when violence is in the offing.”). 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 2–3, 6 (1949). 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at 5 (“The ordinance as construed by the trial court seriously invaded this 
province. It permitted conviction of petitioner if his speech stirred people to anger, 
invited public dispute, or brought about a condition of unrest. A conviction resting on 
any of those grounds may not stand.”). 
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enlightened society and distinguish the United States from 
“totalitarian regimes” throughout the world.88 Thus, in 
Terminiello, the Court began to acknowledge the problem that 
may arise when a crowd of hecklers seeks to silence an 
unpopular viewpoint.89 
In Feiner v. New York, Justices Black and Douglas 
expressed concern that minority viewpoints would continue to 
be silenced by a heckler’s veto.90 Irving Feiner was speaking 
from a wooden box and was critical of “President Truman, the 
American Legion, the Mayor of Syracuse, and other local 
political officials.”91 When Feiner “gave the impression that he 
was endeavoring to arouse the Negro people against the 
whites,” some listeners in the crowd became visibly upset.92 As 
a result, the police asked Feiner to break up the crowd and stop 
speaking.93 However, Feiner refused to leave and kept 
speaking, which resulted in his arrest for disorderly conduct.94 
The majority recognized that “a hostile audience cannot be 
allowed to silence a speaker,” but sided with the State of New 
York’s argument that the police were merely keeping the 
peace.95 The Court balanced Feiner’s right to speak against the 
State’s right to ensure order and decided that it “should not 
reverse this conviction in the name of free speech.”96 However, 
Justices Black and Douglas were concerned about the Court’s 
conclusion that the police may be used to suppress speech 
because people with opposing viewpoints may grow violent.97 
Specifically, the Justices were concerned that this type of police 
action may become a police custom in dealing with unpopular 
 
 88 Id. at 4 (arguing that “it is only through free debate and free exchange of 
ideas that government remains responsive to the will of the people and peaceful change 
is effected. The right to speak freely and to promote diversity of ideas and programs is 
therefore one of the chief distinctions that sets us apart from totalitarian regimes”). 
 89 See generally Terminiello, 337 U.S. 1. 
 90 See Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting); id. 
(Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 91 Id. at 317. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id 
 94 Id at 318. 
 95 Id at 320–21. 
 96 Id. at 321 (“It is one thing to say that the police cannot be used as an 
instrument for the suppression of unpopular views, and another to say that, when as 
here the speaker passes the bounds of argument or persuasion and undertakes 
incitement to riot, they are powerless to prevent a breach of the peace.”). 
 97 Id at 326–27 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 331 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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speakers.98 Justice Black remarked that the Court’s holding 
meant that “minority speakers can be silenced in any city.”99 
Furthermore, Justice Black ominously predicted that while an 
unpopular speaker cannot be restrained from speaking, the 
speaker can be silenced “as soon as the customary hostility to 
his views develops.”100 Justice Black ended his dissent with an 
appeal to deliberative democracy in which he noted that a 
speaker seeking to convince others may exaggerate when 
exercising his right to free speech, but, “in spite of the 
probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the 
long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct 
on the part of the citizens of a democracy.”101 Thus, Justice 
Black introduced the idea of the heckler’s veto in First 
Amendment jurisprudence. 
In Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, the Court again 
addressed the heckler’s veto and its effect on unpopular 
speech.102 In Forsyth County, the county passed an ordinance 
that required groups wishing to hold a parade to pay the 
heightened cost to have a police presence at the parade.103 The 
ordinance was passed in response to a civil rights march that 
was met with opposition from the Ku Klux Klan (“KKK”).104 
When KKK counterdemonstrators began to throw rocks and 
bottles, the police were forced to end the civil rights march.105 
The next weekend, organizers planned an even larger civil 
rights march, which consisted of twenty thousand marchers, 
one thousand counterdemonstrators, and three thousand local 
police and national guardsmen to keep the peace.106 The police 
presence at the larger march cost $670,000, of which Forsyth 
County was responsible for a small portion.107 As a result of the 
large cost, the County of Forsyth passed the ordinance 
requiring parades and demonstrations to pay to have police 
 
 98 Id. at 326–27 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 331 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 99 Id. at 328 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 100 Id. at 329. 
 101 Id. (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940) (Roberts, J.)) 
 102 See generally Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992). 
 103 Id. at 126 (“The ordinance required the permit applicant to defray these costs 
by paying a fee, the amount of which was to be fixed ‘from time to time’ by the Board.”). 
 104 Id. at 125. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. at 125–26. 
 107 Id. at 126. 
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presence.108 Furthermore, the county could adjust the fee based 
on the amount of police presence required at the event.109 The 
Court held that the ordinance was content-based because the 
costs imposed on the marchers were “associated with the 
public’s reaction to the speech” and “[l]isteners’ reaction to 
speech is not a content-neutral basis for regulation.”110 The 
Court added that “[s]peech cannot be financially burdened, any 
more than it can be punished or banned, simply because it 
might offend a hostile mob.”111 
Recently, the Sixth Circuit, in Bible Believers v. Wayne 
County, Michigan, affirmed the government’s affirmative duty 
not to effectuate a heckler’s veto.112 The Bible Believers are a 
Christian evangelical group that protested at the 2012 Arab 
International Festival by holding up signs and hurling words 
that were offensive to Muslims.113 A crowd within the festival 
began to heckle the Bible Believers and, eventually, began to 
throw bottles and garbage at the evangelical protestors.114 The 
Wayne County Sheriff’s Office did not intervene to stop the 
hecklers, but instead asked the Bible Believers to stop using a 
megaphone during their demonstration.115 The Bible Believers 
were given the choice to be arrested for their use of a 
megaphone or leave the festival.116 The Bible Believers were 
escorted from the festival under threat of arrest.117 
 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. at 133–34 (“As construed by the county, the ordinance often requires that 
the fee be based on the content of the speech.”). 
 110 Id. at 134. 
 111 Id. at 134–35. 
 112 Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., 805 F.3d 228, 255 (6th Cir. 2015) (“On this 
record, there can be no reasonable dispute that the WCSO effectuated a heckler’s veto, 
thereby violating the Bible Believers’ First Amendment rights.”). 
 113 Id at 238 (“As they had done the previous year, the Bible Believers traveled to 
the Festival so that they could exercise their sincerely held religious beliefs. 
Unfortunately for the Festival-goers, those beliefs compelled Israel and his followers to 
hurl words and display messages offensive to a predominantly Muslim crowd, many of 
whom were adolescents.”). 
 114 Id. at 239. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. (“Despite this apparent lack of effort to maintain any semblance of order 
at the Festival, each time the police appeared on the video—to reprimand the use of 
the Bible Believers’ megaphone, to suggest that the Bible Believers had the ‘option to 
leave’ the Festival, to trot by on horseback while doing next to nothing, and to expel the 
Bible Believers from the Festival under threat of arrest—the agitated crowd became 
subdued and orderly simply due to the authoritative presence cast by the police officers 
who were then in close proximity.”). 
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The Sixth Circuit held that Wayne County violated the 
First Amendment rights of the Bible Believers when the county 
cut off the Bible Believers’ speech on the basis of the views that 
they were expressing.118 The court found that the Bible 
Believers’ speech was constitutionally protected, and “[w]hen a 
peaceful speaker . . . is confronted by a hostile crowd, the state 
may not silence the speaker as an expedient alternative to 
containing or snuffing out the lawless behavior of the rioting 
individuals.”119 The court based its heckler’s veto analysis on 
the First Amendment’s importance to democracy.120 The court 
recognized that the freedom to espouse political and religious 
beliefs “is too important to our democratic institution for it to 
be abridged simply due to the hostility of reactionary listeners 
who may be offended by a speaker’s message.”121 As a result, 
the court recognized that the Wayne County Sheriff’s Office 
had an affirmative duty to protect the Bible Believers from 
hecklers and to not effectuate the heckler’s veto.122 
The current state of the law on public college campuses 
requires that the government satisfy some form of heightened 
scrutiny when a speaker or group is denied access to a 
traditional or non-traditional public forum.123 Public college 
regulations of speech through speech codes have been plagued 
by vagueness and overbreadth problems in the state and 
federal court systems.124 However, nearly all public college 
campuses still retain speech codes that may have a chilling 
effect on many forms of protected speech.125 Furthermore, the 
rise of PC Culture on college campuses has contributed to the 
chilling of protected speech.126 However, the Supreme Court 
has laid the groundwork, through the heckler’s veto line of 
cases, that government may have an affirmative duty to protect 
deliberation in public forums, such as college campuses.127 
 
 118 Id. at 261–62. 
 119 Id. at 252. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. at 255 (“On this record, there can be no reasonable dispute that the WCSO 
effectuated a heckler’s veto, thereby violating the Bible Believers’ First Amendment 
rights.”). 
 123 See supra Subpart II.A. 
 124 See supra Subpart II.B. 
 125 See supra Subpart II.B. 
 126 See supra Subpart II.C. 
 127 See supra Subpart II.D. 
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III. FREE EXPRESSION AND DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
Deliberative democracy is “a form of government in which 
free and equal citizens . . . justify decisions in a process in 
which they give one another reasons that are mutually 
acceptable and generally accessible, with the aim of reaching 
conclusions that are binding in the present on all citizens but 
open to challenge in the future.”128 The theory of deliberative 
democracy is to provide a blueprint for how the ideal American 
democracy would work, and does work, when all branches of 
government and the people participate in reasoned 
deliberation.129 Deliberative democracy relies on “the idea that 
when free and equal people come together and discuss 
important decisions jointly—justifying their reasons publicly 
on the basis of generally understood principles—then the 
resulting policy will be both better for society and better for the 
participants themselves.”130 Thus, deliberative democracy is 
focused on two main goals: (1) to encourage people to deliberate 
and justify their positions and (2) to produce policy that is the 
best possible outcome for the most people.131 To accomplish 
those goals, deliberative democracy requires that deliberators 
(1) provide reasons for their positions and (2) that the reasons 
be accessible to opposing deliberators.132 Furthermore, as a 
theory, deliberative democracy recognizes that in a 
heterogeneous democracy, such as the United States, diversity 
of opinion may cause instability.133 
Part III will discuss the requirements for a successful, fully-
functioning deliberative democratic system and the threats 
that a deliberative democratic system may face.134 Subpart A 
will discuss the deliberative democratic requirements of 
 
 128 AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? 7 
(2004). 
 129 Maya Sen, Court Deliberation: An Essay on Deliberative Democracy in the 
American Judicial System, 27 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 303, 305 (2013). 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 128, at 3–5 (discussing the three main 
requirements of deliberative democracy). 
 133 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support 
Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279, 1294 (2005) (“Our 
country is more ethnically, religiously, and ideologically heterogeneous now than at 
any previous time in its history—and that diversity is a source of potential 
instability.”). 
 134 See infra Part III. 
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reason-giving and accessibility.135 Last, Subpart B will discuss 
the effects that a lack of deliberation may have on a democratic 
society, such as enclave deliberation and political 
polarization.136 
A. The Requirements of Deliberative Democracy  
Deliberative democracy has two main requirements: 
deliberators must provide reasons for their positions, and those 
reasons must be accessible to the opposing deliberators.137 The 
purpose of the reason-giving requirement is to encourage 
deliberators to discover not only their policy differences, but 
their policy similarities as well.138 The accessibility 
requirement ensures that reasons are given in public and that 
reasons are based on generally understood principles.139 When 
reasons are based on generally understood principles, those 
reasons are both morally acceptable and respectful of the 
opposing side.140 Thus, the requirements of deliberative 
democracy facilitate productive and reasoned deliberation in a 
democracy by focusing on the similar morals that can be 
discovered by opposing parties during deliberation.  
1. Reason-giving  
In a deliberative democracy, if there is deliberation of a 
contentious issue among the politically relevant groups, then 
each side may address opposing arguments in a respectful 
manner and justify its own position to the opposing party.141 
This theory incorporates “an ideal of reciprocity, in which 
citizens are aware of and responsive to one another’s interests 
and claims.”142 The idea of reciprocity is grounded in the idea 
that “[d]eliberation cannot make incompatible views 
compatible, but it can help participants recognize the moral 
merit in their opponents.”143 By providing reasons for their 
 
 135 See infra Subpart III.A. 
 136 See infra Subpart III.B. 
 137 See infra Subpart III.A. 
 138 See supra Subpart III.A.1. 
 139 See supra Subpart III.A.2. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Sen, supra note 129, at 306. 
 142 Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 
37 (1995). 
 143 GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 128, at 11. 
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political positions, deliberators are welcoming moral 
disagreement from opposing deliberators.144 However, the 
practice of reason-giving facilitates mutual respect among 
deliberators that morally disagree by exposing the similarities 
and differences on certain issues.145 Thus, when deliberators 
give reasons for their positions, participants in deliberation can 
learn from their opposition and use their political similarities 
to “develop new views and policies that can more successfully 
withstand critical scrutiny.”146 As a result, reason-giving is the 
first step of deliberation in which deliberators are able to 
discover “their individual and collective misapprehensions” of 
the political opposition.147 Once deliberators have recognized 
their similarities by noting their misapprehensions about their 
political opposition, each side can begin to further develop 
policies and ideas that are more accessible to their opposition. 
2. Accessibility 
The accessibility requirement of deliberative democracy is 
made up of two internal requirements: reason-giving must be 
done in public and the reasons that are given must be based on 
generally understood principles.148 Thus, the accessibility 
requirement means that reasons must be accessible in the 
sense that they must be able to be perceived by deliberators. 
Furthermore, the accessibility requirement means that reasons 
must be accessible in the sense that opposing deliberators can 
understand the underlying premise and support for the reason. 
Deliberation behind closed doors and among private parties is 
not enough. Deliberation must take place in public and “not 
merely in the privacy of one’s mind.”149 When deliberation is 
done in public, deliberators can “expand their knowledge, 
including both their self-understanding and their collective 
 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. at 12 (“Through the give-and-take of argument, participants can learn 
from each other, come to recognize their individual and collective misapprehensions, 
and develop new views and policies that can more successfully withstand critical 
scrutiny.”). 
 147 Id. 
 148 Sen, supra note 129, at 305 (arguing that deliberative democracy depends on 
deliberators “justifying their reasons publicly on the basis of generally understood 
principles”). 
 149 GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 128, at 4. 
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understanding of what will best serve their fellow citizens.”150 
Thus, deliberation must occur in public in order to enable 
deliberators to be responsive to the concerns and morals of the 
opposing deliberators. 
The requirement that deliberators give reasons based on 
generally understood principles is also known as the theory of 
reciprocity.151 The theory of reciprocity, which requires that 
each side justify their positions in a manner that could be 
understood by the opposing party, requires that parties not 
base their positions on theories or ideas that are not reasonably 
acceptable to the opposing side.152 For example, appeals to 
religion as a support for public policy are inaccessible to others 
that do not share the same religious beliefs.153 Furthermore, 
positions which would violate the religious beliefs of the 
opposing party would also violate the principle of reciprocity.154 
Overall, the purpose of deliberative democracy is to reach a 
democratic decision which may be disagreeable to certain 
groups, but is still accessible to them if the disagreeing side can 
understand the essential content of the decision.155 The theory 
of reciprocity is not intended to reconcile views that are 
irreconcilable, but it is intended to clarify specifically how two 
opposing parties can come to an agreement.156 By justifying 
their positions in terms that are accessible to those with 
opposing viewpoints, deliberators will be able to “distinguish 
those disagreements that arise from genuinely incompatible 
values from those that can be more resolvable than they first 
appear.”157 However, genuinely incompatible values may arise 
in deliberation, thus resulting in a lack of agreement on a 
particular reason’s morality. 
The morality requirement is a prerequisite to providing 
reasons based on generally understood principles. In order to 
give a reason in terms that are generally understood, the 
 
 150 Id. at 12. 
 151 Id. at 4. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. 
 154 See Id. 
 155 GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 128, at 4. 
 156 Id. at 11 (“Deliberation cannot make incompatible values compatible, but it 
can help participants recognize the moral merit in their opponents’ claims when those 
claims have merit.”). 
 157 Id. 
Schroeder.325-358.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/31/17 5:23 PM 
344 B.Y.U. EDUCATION & LAW JOURNAL [2017 
reason must be morally acceptable to the opposing party.158 In 
order to be morally acceptable to an opposing party, the 
“argument for the position must presuppose a disinterested 
perspective that could be adopted by any member of a society, 
whatever his or her other particular circumstances (such as 
class, race, or sex).”159 However, because reasonable people may 
disagree on the morality of a particular view, there will often 
be certain reasons and positions that are based on 
unacceptable morals to the opposing side.160 Despite the 
likelihood that opposing sides will settle upon moral reasons 
that are unacceptable to one another, deliberative democracy 
requires that deliberation on other issues continue among 
opposing groups as a result of the mutual respect requirement. 
Deliberative democracy requires that deliberating groups 
practice mutual respect for opposing deliberators and their 
viewpoints.161 Since deliberators will likely have many different 
positions on many different issues, the mutual respect 
requirement ensures that deliberators vehemently opposed on 
one issue can compromise on other less divisive issues.162 
However, the mutual respect requirement is more than just 
tolerance; “[i]t requires a favorable attitude toward, and 
constructive interaction with, the persons with whom one 
disagrees.”163 Thus, the mutual respect requirement demands 
that deliberators “affirm the moral status of their own position 
and acknowledge the moral status of their opponents’ 
position.”164 However, the mutual respect requirement may be 
abused if deliberators acknowledge an opposing deliberator’s 
moral view as immoral for purposes of deliberation.165 Thus, 
when a moral view is treated as immoral for the purposes of 
reason-giving in deliberative democracy, the deliberator that 
refuses to recognize the moral view as moral is stalling the 
 
 158 Id. at 72 (noting that deliberative democracy has a controversial morality 
requirement). 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. at 79 (discussing the mutual respect requirement “that permits democracy 
to flourish in the face of (at least temporarily) irresolvable moral conflict”). 
 162 See id. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. at 81. 
 165 Id. at 83 (“First, acknowledging the moral status of a position that one 
opposes requires, at a minimum, that one treat it as a moral rather than a purely 
political, economic, or other kind of nonmoral view.”). 
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deliberative process.166 As a result, if deliberators abuse the 
mutual respect requirement of deliberative democracy, the 
entire process can come to a screeching halt. 
B. The Effects of a Lack of Deliberation in a Democracy 
Instability due to a diverse society is inevitable, but 
deliberative democracy seeks to defuse the tension by requiring 
reasoned deliberation among “all politically relevant groups.”167 
Deliberative democracy relies on the participation of all 
politically relevant groups because when one or more groups 
exit the deliberative process, democratic progress may come to 
a halt.168 A democratic process coming to a halt is evidenced by 
the numerous numbers of countries that overthrew the political 
establishment during the “Arab Spring,”169 as well as in the 
birth of our own country through the Revolutionary War 
against Great Britain.170 However, deliberative democracy can 
neutralize political upheaval if politically relevant groups 
continue deliberation on a contentious issue.171 
In his book Designing Democracy, Professor Cass Sunstein 
discussed the disastrous effects that result from a lack of 
deliberation in a democracy.172 Professor Sunstein argues that 
when there is a lack of deliberation in a democracy, social 
groups will be driven further apart resulting in extreme 
polarization.173 “Enclave deliberation,” Sunstein says, is 
“deliberation within small groups of like-minded people” which 
may lead to polarization of that particular social group or 
 
 166 Id. (arguing that the first requirement of mutual respect is that the opposing 
party recognize the moral position of the opposing parties if they are actually moral 
positions). 
 167 Eskridge, supra note 133, at 1294. 
 168 Id. (“Pluralist democracy is dynamic and fragile. It is dynamic because the 
nature, composition, and balance of politically relevant groups shift over time. It is 
fragile because it depends on the commitment of all politically relevant groups to its 
processes. Political losers may exit the system unless they think their interests will be 
accommodated or their losses from exiting will exceed their gains.”). 
 169 John Simpson, Who are the Winners and Losers from the Arab Spring?, BBC 
(Mar. 11, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-30003865. 
 170 Eskridge, supra note 133, at 1294. 
 171 Id. at 1295 (“Pluralist democracy potentially engages most citizens in the 
affairs of governance, and that engagement encourages cooperation across the board.”). 
 172 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO 15–
49 (2001). 
 173 Id. at 15 (“When like-minded people meet regularly, without sustained 
exposure to competing views, extreme movements are all the more likely.”). 
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“enclave.”174 Enclave deliberation closely parallels the ideas 
behind establishing safe spaces on college campuses or college 
speech codes enacted to protect minority viewpoints.175 The 
idea of enclave deliberation presents a possible fatal flaw to the 
theory of deliberative democracy because enclave deliberation 
only occurs when a particular social group has either not been 
granted access to deliberation or has not succeeded in the 
deliberative process.176 However, the fact that enclave 
deliberation may exist despite deliberative democracy does not 
mean that the theory of deliberative democracy is not a good 
theory. 
In fact, enclave deliberation may be proof that when 
deliberation fails, social groups may exit the political process, 
thus bolstering the theory of deliberative democracy.177 As 
stated above, deliberative democracy depends on all politically 
relevant groups participating in the deliberative process.178 
When a political minority feels as though its interests have not 
been addressed or that it has not been given adequate 
recognition in the deliberative process, the group may exit the 
political process and cease deliberation.179 In fact, the problem 
of groups exiting the deliberative process is not “mere theory” 
because “democracies fail all the time, including those 
 
 174 Id. 
 175 See supra Part II (discussing the state of free expression on college campuses 
and the establishment of college speech codes as an attempt to protect minority 
viewpoints); see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 172, at 16 (“Hence enclave deliberation 
might be the only way to ensure that those views are developed and eventually heard. 
Without a place for enclave deliberation, citizens in the broader public sphere may 
move in certain directions, even extreme directions, precisely because opposing voices 
are not heard at all.”). 
 176 SUNSTEIN, supra note 172, at 16 (“Group polarization is naturally taken as a 
reason for skepticism about enclave deliberation and for seeking to ensure deliberation 
among a wide group of diverse people. But there is a point more supportive of enclave 
deliberation: Participants in heterogeneous groups tend to give least weight to the 
views of low-status members—in some times and places, women, African Americans, 
less educated people.”). 
 177 Id. at 15 (“As I will show, group polarization helps explain an old point, with 
clear foundations in constitutional law in many nations, to the effect that social 
homogeneity can be quite damaging to good deliberation.”). 
 178 Eskridge, supra note 133, at 1294 (“Pluralist democracy is dynamic and 
fragile. It is dynamic because the nature, composition, and balance of politically 
relevant groups shift over time. It is fragile because it depends on the commitment of 
all politically relevant groups to its processes. Political losers may exit the system 
unless they think their interests will be accommodated or their losses from exiting will 
exceed their gains.”). 
 179 Id. 
Schroeder.325-358.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/31/17 5:23 PM 
2] AVOIDING DELIBERATION 347 
generating prosperity for their citizens.”180 Thus, a political 
group may exit the deliberative process when the political 
group believes it will be accommodated in exchange for 
reentering or the group has something further to gain from 
exiting.181 
Deliberative democracy relies on the idea that when free 
and equal people seek to make political decisions, those people 
must come together and justify their decisions, in public, and in 
terms that are generally understood to all.182 The reason-giving 
requirement and the accessibility requirement of deliberative 
democracy ensure that deliberators are aware of the opposing 
party’s view, are responsive to the opposing party’s view, and 
are respectful of the opposing party’s view.183 When an 
opposing party has a viewpoint that is accessible to the 
opposing side, that viewpoint is both based on generally 
understood principles and morally acceptable.184 If a position is 
based on generally understood principles, then opposing parties 
will thoroughly understand the disagreements that exist and 
the areas where agreements can be made.185 Furthermore, if a 
view is morally acceptable to an opposing party, then the 
opposing views of deliberators can be reconciled on an outcome 
beneficial to all.186 However, if there is a complete lack of 
deliberation, then deliberative democracy will come to a halt 
and any political decisions made will not be the result of 
reasoned deliberation, but of purely partisan politics.187 
Furthermore, the practical effects of a lack of deliberation are 
that political groups may exit the political process and those 
groups will grow further polarized.188 
IV. AVOIDING DELIBERATION 
The avoidance of deliberation on college campuses can be 
directly attributed to the rise of college speech codes and PC 
 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. 
 182 See supra Part III. 
 183 See supra Subpart III.A. 
 184 See supra Subpart III.A.1. 
 185 See supra Subpart III.A.2. 
 186 See supra Subpart III.A.2. 
 187 See supra Subpart III.B. 
 188 See supra Subpart III.B. 
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culture.189 Since their widespread enactment on campuses 
across the country, college speech codes have chilled speech 
that college administrators have deemed to be immoral due to 
their implicit racial or sexual bias. 190 A rise in PC culture 
among college students further bolstered college speech 
codes.191 Due to a combination of speech codes and PC culture, 
college students abuse two of deliberative democracy’s most 
important requirements: the morality requirement and the 
mutual respect requirement.192 Due to such abuses, minority 
political viewpoints may meet with strong backlash from 
students who share opposing viewpoints.193 In order to protect 
minority viewpoints and ensure deliberation, the Supreme 
Court should consider expanding the heckler’s veto doctrine to 
situations in which a heckling majority may unconstitutionally 
stifle a minority viewpoint on a college campus.194 By doing so, 
the Court would bolster its claim in the heckler’s veto cases 
that public deliberation on political issues is the foundation of 
American democracy.195 
A. PC Culture and Speech Codes as a Hindrance to 
Deliberative Democracy 
The combination of college speech codes and student-
imposed PC culture results in a lack of reasoned deliberation 
on American college campuses.196 While campuses enacted 
speech codes to combat a rise in deplorable conduct, they have 
also been complicit in chilling speech.197 Furthermore, the self-
imposition by college students of PC culture on campuses may 
result in college students being punished for what they think 
 
 189 See infra Subpart IV.A. 
 190 See infra Subpart IV.A. 
 191 See infra Subpart IV.A. 
 192 See infra Subpart IV.A. 
 193 See infra Subpart IV.A. 
 194 See infra Subpart IV.B. 
 195 See infra Subpart IV.B. 
 196 Kenneth Lasson, Political Correctness Askew: Excesses in the Pursuit of Minds 
and Manners, 63 TENN. L. REV. 689, 692 (1996) (noting that when it comes to PC 
culture, “[s]omewhere along the way, however, the line between consciousness-raising 
and common sense was grievously breached”); Moore, supra note 15, at 514 (noting 
that college speech codes were enacted to combat a rise in racist, sexist, and 
homophobic speech, but has actually stigmatized opposing viewpoints). 
 197 Moore, supra note 15, at 514–18 (showing that college speech codes were 
enacted to protect college students from racist, sexist, and homophobic speech, but 
were actually enacted as a response to media pressure). 
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and say, regardless of whether the speech is meant to be racist, 
sexist, or homophobic.198 Thus, through the imposition of 
speech codes and the fostering of PC culture, public colleges are 
complicit in the abuse of the morality requirement and the 
mutual respect requirement of deliberative democracy, which 
leads to a lack of deliberation on college campuses. 
Deliberative democracy requires that reasons given during 
deliberation be accessible to the opposing side.199 To be 
accessible, reasons must be morally acceptable to the opposing 
side.200 However, the practical effect of this requirement is that 
if an opposing side deems a position or reason morally 
deplorable, that opposing side may justify itself in not 
participating in deliberation based on this subjective standard 
of immorality.201  
Both students and college administrations have abused the 
morality requirement of deliberative democracy to avoid 
deliberation on contentious societal issues. For example, college 
speech codes, such as the one challenged in Doe v. University of 
Michigan, declared that any speech that “stigmatizes or 
victimizes . . . on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, [or] sex” 
was immoral and could not be used by students on campus.202 
By imposing this particular regulation of speech, the 
University of Michigan declared a vast amount of speech as 
immoral and, thus, barred it from deliberation on campus.203 In 
effect, the policy classified an entire class of speech as being 
immoral.204 
In fact, the plaintiff in Doe v. University of Michigan was a 
biology student who felt that certain theories that relied on the 
biological differences between men and women could be 
“perceived as ‘sexist’ and ‘racist’ by some students, and he 
feared that discussion of such theories might be sanctionable” 
 
 198 Id. at 517 (noting that PC culture on college campuses may be chilling the 
speech of those that are not racist, sexist, or homophobic). 
 199 Sen, supra note 129, at 305 (arguing that deliberative democracy depends on 
deliberators “justifying their reasons publicly on the basis of generally understood 
principles”). 
 200 GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 128, at 72 (discussing the morality 
requirement implicit in the accessibility requirement of deliberative democracy). 
 201 Id. (noting that because of the differing morals of deliberators, certain 
positions will be unacceptable to opposing deliberators). 
 202 721 F. Supp. 852, 856 (E.D. Mich. 1989). 
 203 See id. 
 204 See id. 
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under the speech code.205 Despite the University of Michigan’s 
claims that the speech code only implicated immoral speech, 
this case illustrates that the speech code likely chilled speech 
that was not immoral and could have been discussed openly on 
campus.206 The University of Michigan classified a broad range 
of arguably moral speech as immoral in order to remove it from 
democratic deliberation on campus, thus abusing the morality 
requirement of deliberative democracy. 
Similarly, PC culture has also sought to classify parts of 
speech as immoral.207 PC culture gained popularity because it 
sought to reduce the use of words deemed immoral due to 
implicit racism and sexism, two reasonably immoral 
positions.208 However, PC culture, which was revered as a 
positive reaction to implicit racism and sexism, has now been 
reduced to an outright rejection of common sense due to its 
sweeping disqualification of many viewpoints.209 For example, 
students at Emory University claimed they no longer felt safe 
after chalk drawings in support of Donald Trump for President 
appeared on campus.210 Emory students protested the 
appearance of the chalk drawings by chanting, “You are not 
listening! Come speak to us, we are in pain!” throughout the 
university quad.211 The chants and comments of the Emory 
University students could have resulted in a request for 
deliberation on the issue of whether Trump was a good 
candidate for President.212 However, those same students 
claimed that the pro-Trump chalking promoted “hate and 
discrimination.”213 Thus, the students protesting at Emory 
 
 205 Id. at 858. 
 206 Id. 
 207 Anderson, supra note 18, at 174 (citing John Leo, PC Follies: The Year in 
Review, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Jan. 27, 1992)) (noting that PC Culture “posits 
that because the mere discussion of certain ideas or viewpoints offend certain groups, 
the expression of these ideas or viewpoints should not be allowed”). 
 208 Lasson, supra note 196, at 692. 
 209 Id. (noting that when it comes to PC culture, “[s]omewhere along the way, 
however, the line between consciousness-raising and common sense was grievously 
breached.”). 
 210 Susan Svrluga, Someone Wrote ‘Trump 2016’ on Emory’s Campus in Chalk. 
Some Students Said They No Longer Feel Safe, WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2016/03/24/someone-wrote-
trump-2016-on-emorys-campus-in-chalk-some-students-said-they-no-longer-feel-safe/. 
 211 Id. 
 212 Id. 
 213 Id. (quoting a post on the Emory Latino Student Organization Facebook 
page). 
Schroeder.325-358.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/31/17 5:23 PM 
2] AVOIDING DELIBERATION 351 
University have deemed those supporting Trump for President 
in 2016 as taking an immoral position that cannot satisfy 
deliberative democracy. 
PC culture has had the effect of a Speech Code, but without 
the government action that renders speech codes 
unconstitutional, like the one in Doe v. University of 
Michigan.214 By shifting censorship to a social and cultural 
movement (PC culture) and supplementing it with gutted 
college speech codes, students and colleges combat what they 
believe to be racist and sexist speech. Speech codes and PC 
culture operate in such a way that reasonably moral or 
questionably moral positions have been deemed to be 
absolutely immoral for the purpose of deliberative democracy. 
As a result, opposing deliberators have assumed that certain 
positions are immoral before deliberation on campus can begin; 
deliberation on issues such as the presidential election or 
sexism are not being fully discussed on campus because some 
deliberators cry “Immoral!” prior to deliberation. The abuse of 
the morality requirement by PC culture and college speech 
codes evidences a lack of mutual respect for opposing 
viewpoints. 
Deliberative democracy requires that deliberators practice 
mutual respect to ensure that opposing deliberators can 
compromise on other less contentious issues.215 However, as 
illustrated by PC culture and college speech codes, certain 
positions and the people who take those positions are 
considered unrespectable based on their choice of political 
positions.216 By dismissing opposing deliberators as unworthy 
of respect, students on college campuses have misunderstood 
the point of political debate and reasoned deliberation. First, 
many college students fail to recognize that while an opposing 
deliberator may take one position that is deplorable to them, 
the two sides may share many other positions or views.217 
Second, many college students misunderstand that deliberative 
 
 214 721 F. Supp. 852, 867 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (holding that the University of 
Michigan’s speech code was unconstitutionally vague). 
 215 See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 128, at 79. 
 216 Svrluga, supra note 210 (showing how Emory University students have 
claimed that taking the position that Donald Trump should be President does not 
deserve respect because supporting Trump is racist and hateful). 
 217 See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 128, at 80 (noting that the purpose of 
mutual respect in reasoned deliberation is to ensure cooperation on other less 
contentious issues). 
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democracy does not require tolerance of immoral viewpoints; 
“[i]t requires a favorable attitude toward, and constructive 
interaction with, the persons with whom one disagrees.”218 
Therefore, when college students on campuses such as Emory 
University prematurely declare an entire political group as 
immoral based on one or two policy positions, those students 
abuse the moral and mutual respect requirements of 
deliberative democracy. 
The combination of PC culture and college speech codes 
chill minority political points of view on college campuses. This 
chilling effect is evidenced by the various constitutional 
challenges to speech codes, as well as by examples like the 
student outrage for opposing political speech on the campus of 
Emory University. It is likely that many college campuses that 
employ speech codes and foster PC culture cannot comport with 
deliberative democracy due to abuse of the morality and 
mutual respect requirements. 
B. Using the Heckler’s Veto Cases to Protect Deliberation on 
College Campuses 
The heckler’s veto cases and their commitment to 
deliberative democracy present the perfect line of cases for 
dealing with the problems that speech codes and PC culture 
present for college campuses. If the government forces a public 
speaker to cease speaking based on the violent reaction from 
the speaker’s crowd, then the government has effectuated a 
heckler’s veto.219 The practical implication of the heckler’s veto 
is that any group of people opposed to the viewpoints of the 
speaker may cause enough of a ruckus to convince the police 
that public safety is at risk, thus causing the police to end the 
speech.220 In most of the cases in which the Supreme Court has 
been faced with a heckler’s veto case, the Court has ruled in 
favor of the speaker that claimed his First Amendment right 
was infringed.221 However, in Feiner v. New York, the Court 
 
 218 Id. 
 219 Leanza, supra note 78, at 1308 (describing the factual situation in which 
heckler’s veto cases may arise). 
 220 Id. 
 221 Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 5 (1949) (holding that a conviction 
for disturbing the peace based solely on the fact that the speaker’s speech “stirred 
people to anger, invited public dispute, or brought about a condition of unrest” could 
not stand); Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134–35 (1992) (holding 
that speech cannot be financially burdened “simply because it might offend a hostile 
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refused to reverse a defendant’s conviction because it equated 
his speech with inciting a riot.222 Despite the Court’s apparent 
inconsistency in combatting heckler’s vetoes, in each decision 
either the majority opinion or the dissenting opinion has 
opined about the importance of deliberation and free 
expression in our democracy.223 
While the Court often adheres to the idea of deliberative 
democracy, it has also hinted that protection for minority 
speakers may extend a bit further than having their 
convictions overturned for not comporting with the First 
Amendment. For example, in Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 
the Court hinted that the government may have an affirmative 
duty to protect a speaker whose speech is safeguarded under 
the First Amendment from a hostile crowd.224 The Terminiello 
Court mentioned that protected speech may “induce[] a 
condition of unrest,” but the speaker, because his speech is 
protected, cannot be silenced because of the unrest that results 
from disagreement in the crowd.225 The Terminiello Court 
implied that police must protect speakers espousing protected 
speech from a crowd that grows violent in reaction to the 
speech.226 In Feiner, Justice Black argued outright that the 
police had an affirmative duty to protect a speaker from an 
unruly crowd if the speaker’s speech was protected by the First 
Amendment.227 Justice Black recognized that the police, in this 
 
mob”). But see Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320–21 (1951) (holding that the 
speaker’s speech crossed the line into unprotected speech when it stirred a crowd to 
violence and forced the police to arrest the speaker to quell the violence). 
 222 Feiner, 340 U.S. at 321 (“It is one thing to say that the police cannot be used 
as an instrument for the suppression of unpopular views, and another to say that, 
when as here the speaker passes the bounds of argument or persuasion and undertakes 
incitement to riot, they are powerless to prevent a breach of the peace.”). 
 223 See, i.e., Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4 (arguing that “it is only through free 
debate and free exchange of ideas that government remains responsive to the will of 
the people and peaceful change is effected.”); Feiner, 340 U.S. at 329 (Black, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940) (“[I]n spite of the 
probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to 
enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy.”). 
 224 Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4 (“Accordingly a function of free speech under our 
system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose 
when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they 
are, or even stirs people to anger.”). 
 225 Id. 
 226 Id. (implying that a speaker should be protected from an unruly crowd as long 
as the speaker’s speech does not present a clear and present danger under Chaplinsky). 
 227 Feiner, 340 U.S. at 326 (Black, J., dissenting) (“Moreover, assuming that the 
‘facts’ did indicate a critical situation, I reject the implication of the Court’s opinion 
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case, had a duty “to protect the petitioner’s right to talk, even 
to the extent of arresting the man who threatened to 
interfere.”228 
The Court took a similar position in Forsyth County v. 
Nationalist Movement when it held that “[s]peech cannot be 
financially burdened, any more than it can be punished or 
banned, simply because it might offend a hostile mob.”229 The 
Court decided Forsyth County in the context of whether a state 
county may charge fees for police protection at a parade or rally 
that was likely to require heightened security due to hostile 
crowds.230 Thus, the Court was implying that the government 
and police have an affirmative duty, regardless of the cost, to 
protect speakers from violent crowds.231 
The Sixth Circuit has also interpreted heckler’s veto cases 
as imposing an affirmative duty on the government to protect 
the minority viewpoint from a hostile crowd.232 The Sixth 
Circuit, in Bible Believers v. Wayne County, Michigan, noted 
that the police refused to quell the violent hecklers, but instead 
targeted the minority Bible Believers as being the cause of the 
violence in the crowd.233 The court in Bible Believers said that 
“[w]hen a peaceful speaker . . . is confronted by a hostile crowd, 
the state may not silence the speaker as an expedient 
alternative to containing or snuffing out the lawless behavior of 
the rioting individuals.”234 Thus, according to the Sixth Circuit, 
police must arrest and quell violent hecklers in order to protect 
constitutionally protected speakers from violence due to their 
speech.235 
The Supreme Court’s and the Sixth Circuit’s focus on free 
 
that the police had no obligation to protect petitioner’s constitutional right to talk. The 
police of course have power to prevent breaches of the peace. But if, in the name of 
preserving order, they ever can interfere with a lawful public speaker, they first must 
make all reasonable efforts to protect him.”). 
 228 Id. at 327. 
 229 Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134–35 (1992). 
 230 Id. at 126 (noting that the county ordinance was passed in order to require 
demonstrations and parades to pay to have a police presence as a response to violent 
crowd reactions). 
 231 Id. at 134–35 (“Speech cannot be financially burdened, any more than it can 
be punished or banned, simply because it might offend a hostile mob.”). 
 232 Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., 805 F.3d 228, 255 (6th Cir. 2015) (“On this 
record, there can be no reasonable dispute that the WCSO effectuated a heckler’s veto, 
thereby violating the Bible Believers’ First Amendment rights.”). 
 233 Id. at 241. 
 234 Id. at 252. 
 235 Id. at 252–53. 
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expression in a democracy, coupled with the implication that 
the government has an affirmative duty to protect 
constitutionally-protected speakers, illustrates that the 
government has an affirmative duty to promote deliberative 
democracy. Thus, when a public college effectuates a heckler’s 
veto, the college has violated the tenets of both deliberative 
democracy and the First Amendment of the Constitution.  
However, there are numerous ways that a public college can 
avoid violating the Constitution by fostering an educational 
environment that enables deliberative democracy. For example, 
when a political group seeks to hold a demonstration in a 
traditional public forum on a college campus,236 the college 
administration should reserve an adjacent tract of land for 
groups with opposing viewpoints. By providing an area for 
opposing viewpoints in a traditional public forum, the 
deliberative democratic requirement that reasons be given in 
public is satisfied.237 Furthermore, by affirmatively granting 
opposing viewpoints access to an adjacent space, the public 
college would foster the reason-giving requirement of 
deliberative democracy.238 By granting groups with opposing 
viewpoints access to the same crowd, the two groups could 
make their similarities and differences better known to 
passersby and to each other.239 Most importantly, by granting 
access to an adjacent tract of land to opposing groups, public 
colleges could combat the abuse of the morality and mutual 
respect requirements of deliberative democracy by many 
student groups.240 If public colleges thus fostered deliberation, 
student groups abusing the morality requirement by declaring 
opposing viewpoints immoral and not worthy of deliberation 
would be forced to deliberate and defend the merits of their 
 
 236 Page & Hunnicutt, supra note 12, at 11 (noting that traditional public fora on 
college campuses have been identified as “streets, sidewalks, open mall areas, and 
other generally public areas on campus”). 
 237 Sen, supra note 129, at 305 (stating that deliberative democracy requires that 
reasons be given in public). 
 238 Id. at 306. 
 239 GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 128, at 12 (“Through the give-and-take of 
argument, participants can learn from each other, come to recognize their individual 
and collective misapprehensions, and develop new views and policies that can more 
successfully withstand critical scrutiny.”). 
 240 See supra Subpart III.A.2. (discussing the morality requirement, which many 
college students have abused by declaring many opposing viewpoints as immoral in 
order to avoid deliberation on the merits). 
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positions.241 Similarly, by fostering public deliberation, public 
colleges would ensure that student groups that abuse the 
mutual respect requirement by painting their ideological 
opponents as bigots would be forced to face their opponents and 
debate them on the merits.242 Thus, this hypothetical public 
college would satisfy deliberative democracy and would pass 
constitutional muster if challenged. 
This hypothetical public college’s regulation described 
above would pass constitutional muster because the regulation 
allowing opposing viewpoints access to the same crowd would 
be a content-neutral regulation of speech.243 First, the public 
college would be furthering the important governmental 
interest of fostering deliberation in a democratic society.244 
Second, the government’s interest would not be related to the 
suppression of the speech as long as the government has not 
actively searched for opposing protestors to place on the 
adjacent tract of land.245 Third, the only incidental 
infringement of the First Amendment that may arise would 
occur if the protestors (provided with an adjacent area to 
protest) grew violent and the government effectuated heckler’s 
veto against the protest that was initially planned.246 However, 
if the heckler’s veto cases impose an affirmative duty on 
government to protect an unpopular speaker or group from a 
violent crowd, the campus police must do everything they can 
to quell the violence, thus avoiding the First Amendment 
issue.247 
Public colleges may run afoul of the Constitution in a case 
where a political speaker speaks in a non-traditional public 
 
 241 Id. 
 242 Id. 
 243 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (holding that content-
neutral regulations of speech are permissible when they further an important 
governmental interest, the government’s interest is not related to suppression of the 
speech, and the restriction on free speech is no greater than is essential to accomplish 
the interest). 
 244 Id. at 377; see also Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) 
(arguing that “it is only through free debate and free exchange of ideas that 
government remains responsive to the will of the people and peaceful change is 
effected.”); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 329 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940)) (arguing that “in spite of the 
probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to 
enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy”). 
 245 O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. 
 246 Id. 
 247 See supra notes 221–40 and accompanying text. 
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forum as defined in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and 
Education Fund.248 The Cornelius Court defined such a forum 
as “a place or channel of communication for use by the public at 
large for assembly and speech, for use by certain speakers, or 
for the discussion of certain subjects.”249 Thus, when a public 
college allows a political speaker to speak in a campus 
auditorium, the public college has granted access to a non-
traditional public forum.250 However, situations may arise 
where protestors interrupt the constitutionally protected 
speaker in such a way that the speaker may be asked to stop 
speaking. By asking the speaker to stop speaking, rather than 
removing hecklers from the auditorium, a public college would 
be effectuating a heckler’s veto. In order to facilitate 
deliberation and avoid the heckler’s veto problem, a public 
college should require that a speaker accept questions after his 
speech or allow for an opposing group to have a demonstration 
outside of the auditorium. However, a public college may not 
pick and choose who may enter the auditorium based on their 
opposition to the speaker’s ideology or speech.251 
If a public college restricted protestors’ access to a speech 
given in an auditorium, the public college would be 
unconstitutionally discriminating based on viewpoint.252 Thus, 
the public college must allow people to attend the speech, 
regardless of their group affiliation or whether they oppose the 
speaker. However, once the protestor has begun to disrupt the 
speaker in a way that hinders the speech or disrupts 
discussion, the public college may remove the protestor due to 
nonconformance with the reasonable “time, place, and manner” 
restriction that a speaker in a non-traditional public forum be 
allowed to speak undisturbed.253 Furthermore, removal of an 
unruly protestor would be justified by the fact that the public 
college allowed for a question-and-answer forum, as well as 
opposing protests outside the forum. Thus, the public college 
that fostered deliberation through question-and-answer session 
 
 248 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985) (defining non-traditional public forum). 
 249 Id. 
 250 Id. 
 251 Id. at 800. 
 252 Id. (holding that public colleges may not exclude expression merely because 
the public college opposes the speaker’s view). 
 253 Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 192–93 (1972) (“Just as in the community at 
large, reasonable regulations with respect to the time, the place, and the manner in 
which student groups conduct their speech-related activities must be respected.”). 
Schroeder.325-358.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/31/17 5:23 PM 
358 B.Y.U. EDUCATION & LAW JOURNAL [2017 
and protests outside of the auditorium could not be accused of 
infringing First Amendment rights. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Due to the rise of college speech codes and PC culture, 
college campuses have failed to foster the reasoned deliberation 
that would benefit a democracy. A combination of speech codes 
and PC culture has chilled speech related to minority political 
viewpoints and resulted in a lack of reasoned deliberation on 
college campuses across the country. Various student groups 
and political organizations have abused the ideals of 
deliberative democracy. They have done so by claiming that all 
viewpoints of entire political groups are immoral based on only 
one or two viewpoints being reasonably immoral. Furthermore, 
the same student groups and political organizations have failed 
to practice mutual respect for their opposing deliberators by 
painting all opposing deliberators as bigoted or sexist and, 
thus, avoiding deliberation. To counter these abuses, public 
colleges should foster deliberation by providing counter-protest 
areas for opposing viewpoints to be heard. Furthermore, public 
colleges should foster deliberation when speakers give speeches 
in auditoriums by requiring a question-and-answer session or 
requiring that an area outside of the auditorium be reserved 
for a protest to counter the speaker.  
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